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Abstract—This paper presents an experimental design and data
analytics approach aimed at power-based malware detection on
general-purpose computers. Leveraging the fact that malware
executions must consume power, we explore the postulate that
malware can be accurately detected via power data analytics. Our
experimental design and implementation allow for programmatic
collection of CPU power profiles for fixed tasks during uninfected
and infected states using five different rootkits. To characterize
the power consumption profiles, we use both simple statistical
and novel, sophisticated features. We test a one-class anomaly
detection ensemble (that baselines non-infected power profiles)
and several kernel-based SVM classifiers (that train on both
uninfected and infected profiles) in detecting previously unseen
malware and clean profiles. The anomaly detection system
exhibits perfect detection when using all features and tasks,
with smaller false detection rate than the supervised classifiers.
The primary contribution is the proof of concept that baselining
power of fixed tasks can provide accurate detection of rootkits.
Moreover, our treatment presents engineering hurdles needed for
experimentation and allows analysis of each statistical feature
individually. This work appears to be the first step towards
a viable power-based detection capability for general-purpose
computers, and presents next steps toward this goal.
I. INTRODUCTION
The current ability to protect networked assets from mali-
cious software (malware) is proving vastly insufficient, which
poses a serious national threat as attacks may result in halting
critical infrastructure, disclosing state secrets, and financial
losses in the billions of dollars. Signature-based detection
malware methods, in which a specific pattern is identified
and used to detect attacks with the same pattern, exhibit low
false detection rates and are generally the first line of defense.
Yet, they are ineffective against unseen attack patterns and are
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simply unable to keep pace with the rate and sophistication
of modern malware. For example, machine-generated malware
variants create novel malware in extremely high volume that
bypass detection, and polymorphic malware avoids detection
by regularly rewriting portions of itself so that it is syn-
tactically different but semantically identical. In addition to
the problem of novel and polymorphic malware side-stepping
signature-based methods, a host of other deficiencies exist. For
instance, signature extraction and distribution is a complex and
time consuming task; signature generation involves manual
intervention and requires strict code analysis; the size of
signature repositories is growing at an alarming rate; signature
updates are expensive to implement in terms of downtime and
system resources; and most detection software requires highly
privileged status to operate, which induces vulnerabilities.
Current research, typically based on behavior analysis, seeks
complementary methods to assist in malware detection. A
common weakness of these detection methods stems from
the fact that they operate on the machine being monitored,
which can and has allowed attackers to disable the monitoring
software or modify it to prevent detection after gaining entry
to the computer. This is particularly relevant for rootkits, a
type of computer malware that attains administrative priv-
ileges, thereby concealing themselves from many detection
methods. Another line of detection research (including this
work) has gained traction in the embedded system space
(e.g., programmable logic controllers (PLCs), pharmaceutical
compounders, or electric grid synchrophasors) by using out-of-
band monitoring of side-channel data (e.g., vibrations, timing,
temperature, power, etc.) [1], [2], [3], [4], [5], [6]. There is
a theoretically sound, fundamental observation upon which
these works rely—if a device’s operations are changed by
the malicious actor, then some physical consequence must be
realized; hence, the research question addressed by all such
efforts is, “Can unwanted software be accurately identified
by monitoring some physical observable?”. Such efforts entail
engineering physical sensors and data science techniques to
extract the malicious signal from ambient noise. Discussed
more in the the related work Sec. (II), these advancements
generally leverage an element of invariability in the device
being protected, e.g., regularity of synchrophasors’ signal
timing, to limit noise. Consequently, their applicability to
devices accommodating more variable use (e.g., smart phones,
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general-purpose computers) is much more difficult (e.g., see
Hoffman et al. [7]) and less explored.
In this work, we take the first steps to extend power data
analysis for malware detection on general-purpose computers.
Our goal in this work is to prove the concept that malware ac-
tions leave a detectable signal in the CPU’s power data, and to
experiment with statistical learning techniques to measure their
efficacy in detection. Moreover, we target rootkits—malware
that takes steps to hide its presence, (e.g., by augmenting
the user-visible process list)—pursuing the hypothesis that
masking efforts must alter the power profile, allowing a new
avenue for detection.
To this end, we design an experimental setup consisting
of a general-purpose computer running Windows operating
system (OS) with out-of-band power monitoring hardware and
a programmatic workflow for running a set of tasks both
with and without malware present. This allows us to monitor
and, in a repeatable manner, collect the direct current (DC)
power supplying the CPU while performing common tasks
under both uninfected and infected states. Descriptions of
our testbed, experimental design, and engineering challenges
incurred comprise Sec. III. Initial visual analysis of the power
profile of a general-purpose computer, even while sitting
idle, shows that the seemingly random or unexpected spikes
in power do occur. These can be traced back to normal
background services, but they illustrate the challenge of our
hypothesis under investigation—do the executions of malware
during a fixed set of actions produce strong enough changes
to the power consumption for accurate detection, even in the
presence of the ambient but somewhat unpredictable noise? To
test this hypothesis, we proceed in Sec. IV to build a detection
capability from statistical data analysis and to test data-analytic
techniques to see if the malware is accurately identifiable.
We first propose an unsupervised learning approach that
treats this as a one-class problem. During training, the algo-
rithm only sees uninfected power profiles that are collected
while the machine does a fixed set of tasks. The trained
detector is then tested on power profiles collected while the
same tasks are executed during non-infected and infected
states. We note that a common problem for anomaly de-
tection (and specifically intrusion detection applications) is
the base rate fallacy; e.g., see Axelsson [8].1 The proposed
unsupervised detection method uses an ensemble of single-
feature anomaly detectors with the goal of battling the base
rate fallacy; specifically, we seek an anomaly detection method
that decreases the false detection rate without sacrificing recall
(the true-positive rate).
We also present supervised detection algorithms (several
kernel-based support vector machines (SVMs)) equipped with
the same features as the anomaly detector. For testing we use
hold-one-out cross validation. That is, the learning algorithm
1The base rate fallacy is the presence of both a low false positive rate
(percentage of negatives that are misclassified) and a high false detection rate
(percentage of alerts that are false positives). The base rate fallacy is often
caused by high class imbalance (orders of magnitude more negatives than
positives), and hence is a chronic issue for anomaly & intrusion detection.
is privy to both uninfected and infected power profiles during
training and testing, but the training and testing malware is
disjoint. Hence, this tests if the supervised detection system
can detect never-before-seen malware given observations of
both non-infected and infected power profiles.
A. Contributions
This is the first research work to attempt to detect malware
on a general-purpose computer by analyzing the power con-
sumption of the CPU. Our testbed and experimental setup,
consisting of a general-purpose computer, power-monitoring
hardware, and custom software, is designed to collect power
profiles programmatically with the computer in an uninfected
state and while infected by five different rootkits. The de-
sign, challenges and unique solutions to the data collection
framework are research contributions. Our anomaly detection
ensemble and the results contribute to the anomaly detection
research in a variety of ways. First, our analysis allows
evaluation of each statistical feature’s efficacy in malware
detection, in particular, showing which features help, hurt,
and are inconsequential for accurate detection. Second, we
provide novel applications of time-series analysis tools, for
example, our data-driven approach for transforming time-
series power data into a sequence of curve shapes. Third, the
unsupervised detection results display the quantitative gain
in the false detection rate of the ensemble over any of the
constituent members with no expense to the true positive
rate. This shows that the ensemble directly addresses the
base rate fallacy and supports a growing body of literature
in this area [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14], [15], [16]. Finally,
our anomaly detection ensemble outperforms the supervised
algorithms—perhaps surprising given that the latter is privy to
other known malware profiles during training.
Our results confirm, at least in this experimental setting,
that (1) malware does leave a noticeable trace in the power
profile, and (2) sophisticated malware can be detected without
prior behavior analysis. The consequence of our findings is that
accurate detection of malware is possible by first baselining a
fixed workload and then periodically running that workload to
check the new power profile against the baseline. Moreover,
our rootkit investigations revealed that many otherwise-hard-
to-detect rootkits take actions to hide their modifications upon
investigations of registries (e.g, [17]), process lists, or upon
web activity (and presumably caused by other events); hence,
this work is a first step to an envisioned technology that
baselines the power consumption of a small, fixed set of tasks
on an uninfected computer and then uses anomaly detection
to identify malware infections.
II. RELATED WORK
Previous work explored power consumption acquisition
aimed at studying power efficiency of servers [18], [19] and
mobile devices [20]. Here, we present more details on related
works that explored the use of power consumption for malware
detection. These works were focused on embedded medical
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devices [1], mobile devices [7], [21], and software-defined
radio, PLC and smart grid systems [2], [3], [4], [5].
Clark et al. [1] achieved accurate results using supervised
classification for malware detection based on power consump-
tion of an embedded medical device and a pharmaceutical
compounder (an industrial control workstation). Note that their
work is based on monitoring the alternating current (AC)
outlet, while we are monitoring direct current (DC) channels.
The drawback of monitoring AC is a consequence of periodic
changes of current direction, which lead to reverses of the
voltage, making the analog circuits much more susceptible
to noise. Also, their approach was tested only on embedded
devices, which have a limited set of instructions. Therefore,
acquiring and analyzing power consumption data on these de-
vices is less challenging than on a general-purpose computer.
Hoffman et al. [7] evaluated whether malware can be
detected on smartphones by analyzing its power consumption.
The proposed approach failed due to the noise introduced by
unpredictable user and environment interactions. More recent
work by Azmoodeh et al. [21] demonstrated that ransomware
can be detected on Android devices by monitoring power
consumption alone. These works differ from our approach in
the way power data was collected. While each used a software
that was running on the device being monitored, we use out-
of-band hardware monitoring the power profiles on a separate
machine. Furthermore, in addition to running non-malicious
software and malware separately, we also combine each non-
malicious software with malware when collecting the power
profiles.
Power-based integrity assessment for software-defined radio
was a focus of Gonza´lez et al. [2], [3] who captured the fine-
grained measurements of the processor’s power consumption
and compared them against signatures from trusted software.
This method was adopted by the PFP firm (http://pfpcyber.
com/), which characterized the execution of trusted software
by extracting its power signatures (patterns that result from the
specific sequence of bit transitions during execution) and then
using them as a reference to compare time-domain traces in
order to determine whether the same code was executing. This
commercial tool is also applicable to embedded systems [4],
[5]. It appears that no prior research has tested the efficacy
of power profile analysis for malware detection on general-
purpose computers.
Our data analytics method uses multiple anomaly detectors
informing a final ensemble detector. The use of ensembles of
detectors to increase detection accuracy is not uncommon [9],
[10], [22], [11], [14], [15]; however, our specific formulation is
indeed unique. Specific novel contributions include the follow-
ing: we introduce a data-driven technique to learn canonical
shapes in the power curves (which permits analysis by sequen-
tial learning algorithms); we test the new Data Smashing [23]
technique for time-series analysis on two separate symbol
representations of power data; we formulate a z-score, single-
feature detector from computing both permutation entropy (see
Cao et al. [24]) and information variance with application
results to power-based malware detection; finally, we introduce
a simple “z-score of z-score” anomaly detection ensemble,
and exhibit results showing it outperforms the single-feature
detectors lowering false positives but raising recall.
Our detection method uses multiple anomaly detectors in-
forming a final ensemble detector. The strategy is to model
heterogeneous characteristics of the power data to increase
detection accuracy. This follows previous IDS applications of
ensemble anomaly detectors [9], [10], [11], [14], [15].
III. TEST BED DESIGN, ROOTKITS, & DATA COLLECTION
Our conjecture is that for a fixed task, malware’s actions
will produce sufficient deviation in the power profile to admit
detection. To test this, we use three tasks, two tasks that we
believe will change in the presence of rootkits—web browsing
with Internet Explorer (IE) and probing the registry—and a
final task, letting the computer sit idle, to test if malware
executions are detectable when no other execution commands
are given. IE was chosen because it has been proven that
some rootkits affect the performance of browsers [25]. The
registry was chosen because rootkits often make modifications
to it and then use a driver to hide the modified registry keys
from observation [17]. Registry modification is a common
element of most Windows programs, so merely watching
process behavior for this trait would not give accurate malware
detection. What is uncommon is for programs to then take
actions that prevent their registry modifications from being
observed by other processes scanning the registry, a concealing
characteristic of some malware [17].
A. Hardware and Software Configuration
Anticipating that the effects of malware execution on power
signals are subtle, significant effort was spent sensing and
recording the power use data. Our experiments were run on
a Dell OptiPlex 755 machine running 32-bit Windows 7. To
record the data for our experiments, we used a Measure-
ment Computing Data Acquisition2 (DAQ) system. Separate
channels on the DAQ were connected through a printed
circuit board (PCB) sensor to separate voltage sources on the
computer’s motherboard power connector, and the voltage and
current were collected on each DC power channel.
The vendor-provided DAQ software, TracerDAQ Pro v.
2.3.1.0, acquires, analyzes, and displays data from the DAQ’s
channels [26]. Our experimentation revealed that TracerDAQ
Pro admits too little control over sampling rates and exper-
iment length, and that acquired data precision is limited to
three decimal places. Consequently, we developed our own
program that directly accesses the DAQ to gather data using
custom software that had three distinct advantages: (1) data
has 16 bits of precision; (2) we were able to better control the
sample recording rates and vary the sample timings; (3) we
could make real-time calculations that helped assure that data
is in the expected time ranges.
As most malware initiates malicious traffic (e.g., click fraud,
beaconing, spamming, etc.), unfiltered Internet access for the
2DAQ model USB-1608G Series with 16 channels used. www.mccdaq.com
3
experimental machine is necessary so malware operates with
full functionality. For our experiments, an unfiltered, segre-
gated network was created using a cellular data connection
to the Internet that passed through another computer, the
data repository, that was used to monitor and collect the
Fig. 1: (Left) voltage and current sensor
PCB depicted used to obtain the monitor
power consumption from the experimental
machine. (Right) ATX power extender cable
attached to the DAQ depicted. The outputs
for current, voltage, and ground from the
sensor were wired to channels on the DAQ.
power data before
connecting to the
experimental machine.
Two advantages
emerged from this
segregated network.
(1) This design
allowed the rootkits to
behave normally, while
avoiding any possibility
of them infecting other
computers on our
network. (2) It allowed
us to monitor, record,
and analyze the
experimental machine’s network traffic. For example, using
Wireshark, we observed that several rootkits used in our
experiments redirected web traffic to advertisement sites and
malware as it attempted command and control contact. More
details about the hardware and software configuration can be
found in our technical report [27].
B. Data Collection & Rootkits
Although we collected data from eight channels (four
voltage channels and four corresponding current channels),
the results in this paper only utilize the +12V CPU rail’s
data. As part of the data preprocessing, the voltage and
current channels were multiplied to obtain a quadruple of
power consumption for each sample time. The sampling rate,
computed as the median difference in power samples, was
0.0170s, with variance on the order of 10−6s.
The power consumption of the general-purpose computer
was recorded while completing the idle, IE, and registry
tasks, first in a clean state and again after infection. No
other workload ran on the experimental machine. To automate
the tasks and ensure repeatability between experiments, a
Python script orchestrated the following specified sequence of
events. During the data collection process, the experimental
machine was idle for a three minute period. In the case of IE,
fifteen windows were open with a five second delay between
each, and then each of these windows was closed before
the script continued with the next task, probing the registry.
In case of probing the registry, we used regedit to copy all
the information from the Windows registry to a .reg file. By
scripting workflow tasks, we ensure a repeatable sequence of
commands. To delimit and identify tasks in the power profile,
a C++ program was written and called between each task
in order to insert “markers” that could be recorded by the
DAQ. This program performed calculations stressing the CPU
of the experimental machine to 100%, causing a noticeable
plateau in the CPU power profile. After data collection, a
MATLAB script processed the power profile data, detected
these embedded markers as start and end points to distinguish
between different tasks of the experiment. This is the source
of the data segments used in the malware detection algorithms
presented in this paper.
To ensure the experimental machine was returned to the
same initial state between experiments, we made a clean in-
stallation of Windows using Clonezilla (www.clonezilla.org/).
With this preparation, the Python script was started on the
experimental machine, while power consumption data was
recorded on the data repository. After completing the sequence
of tasks in this uninfected state, the experimental machine was
infected with a particular rootkit. Then the sequence of tasks
was repeated by the Python script and, after collection, the
power consumption data was labeled as infected. Fig. 2 shows
power data for the +12V CPU rail from a single run of the
Python script.
As seen in Fig. 2, even within the sections where the
machine is idle, there are still periods of elevated power use.
We investigated these events by correlating elevated power
use events to Windows processes starting and ending. We
were able to attribute these power use events to Microsoft-
provided background services which are a normal part of
the Windows environment. This illustrates the main challenge
of profiling power consumption of fixed tasks on a general-
purpose computer, background processes contribute noise to
the power profiles. The hypothesis under investigation is that
the executions of malware during various tasks and idle peri-
ods produce a significant-enough change in the power usage
to admit accurate detection in the presence of the ambient but
somewhat unpredictable normal executions.
Next we discuss the rootkit samples used. A rootkit is a
“kit” consisting of small programs that allow a permanent
or consistent, undetectable presence on a computer [17].
Basically, a rootkit locates and modifies the software on the
computer system with the purpose of masking its behavior; for
example, patching, a technique that modifies the data bytes
encoded in an executable code, is an example of a type of
modification that can be made [17].
For our experiments, five different malware programs were
used, and each exhibits traits of a rootkit and/or actions for
camouflaging itself. Alureon, also known as TDL4 or TDSS, is
a Trojan that attempts to steal personal data. It encrypts itself
in the master boot record, which makes it exceptionally hard
to detect [28], can remove competitor’s malware, and hides
communication via encryption. Pihar, an Alueron variant also
known as Purple Haze, is capable of changing system settings
without any manual direction, reconfiguring the Windows
registry editor or keys, and disabling the AV software [29].
Like Alureon and Pihar, Xpaj is another rootkit that hides in
the master boot record [30]. Xpaj uses several methods of code
obfuscation and encryption to hide its presence in the infected
file. On the other hand, Sirefef, also known as Zero Access, is
a trojan that is used to download other malware on the infected
machine from a botnet that is mostly involved in bitcoin
mining and click fraud. Sirefef also overrides the registry
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Fig. 2: Power profile of +12V CPU depicted for each task before and after infection with Xpaj rootkit. Tasks labeled and demarcated by red vertical bars.
and browser settings to hide itself [31]. Like Alureon, it will
spoof online search queries and the user will be redirected
to malicious websites. Finally, Max rootkit is a Trojan that
sometimes destroys information and files on its host computer,
and changes Windows Explorer settings to download other
malicious files [32].
Upon installation, to verify that the experimental machine
was successfully infected with each one of these rootkit
examples, two malware removal tools (TDSSkiller [33] and
Microsoft Windows Malicious Software Removal Tool [34])
were used. Note that these tools were not used to clean the
experimental machine. We analyzed each rootkit using the
web-based application called VxStream Sandbox [35] to see
which Windows API functions were being called. In total, for
each of the three tasks (Idle, IE, and Registry) we collected
power profile data for 15 runs in an uninfected state and 15
in an infected state (three per rootkit).
IV. DATA ANALYSIS APPROACH & RESULTS
Exploring the hypothesis that malware execution necessarily
changes the power profile, we formulate and test two detection
approaches. The first approach is unsupervised, viewing the
detection task as a one-class anomaly detection problem. This
gives us slightly stronger initial hypotheses than other anomaly
detection applications, which see all historical data out of
which only a small portion are positive (malicious/noteworthy)
and the majority negative (normal). For example, see Harshaw
et al. [14] where robust statistic methods were used to accom-
modate possible attacks in historical network data by prevent-
ing outlier observations (possibly unknown attack) from affect-
ing their models. Our unsupervised detection method proceeds
by creating a baseline from ten uninfected power profiles and
detecting sufficient deviations in test profiles as infected. This
has the obvious advantage that no prior observations of data
collected under the presence of malware is necessary. The
second, supervised approach assumes knowledge of previously
observed uninfected and infected data. More specifically, we
train and test on an equal number of uninfected and infected
profiles, but the positively-labeled testing profiles are those
rootkit-infected profiles never seen in training. Hence, both
scenarios are designed to test detection capabilities against
never-seen-before malware. Both use the same set of features.
A. Features
Modeling diverse qualities of the data gives more avenues
of detection; hence, we craft a variety of features modeling
statistical properties of the power data sample as well as many
time-varying characteristics. For each task (IE, Registry, Idle),
the power profile of a given run is transformed into a feature
vector. The first four features are statistical moments, which
encode characteristics of the power data regarded as a set
of independent and identically distributed (IID) samples of a
distribution. The remaining features (L2 distance, permutation
entropy, and Data Smashing distances) seek to describe time-
dependent properties of the power profile. For these features
it is convenient to have uniformly sampled power data. To
obtain uniform times, all observations in a run are shifted
by their initial time, so time uniformly begins at t = 0.
Next, the time-stamped data points are linearly connected to
define the power profile for all time values, and then sampled
for each multiple of .01 seconds. Note power samples occur
with a median .0170 seconds apart and variance on the order
of 10−6 seconds, so by using the finer-grained samples, we
obtain a close approximation of the observed profile that is
also uniformly spaced.
1) Statistical Moments: In order to model the distribution
of the power data, we use (empirical estimates of) the mean
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(first moment), variance, skewness, and kurtosis (second-
fourth normalized central moments).3
2) L2-Norm Error: Regarding each power profile as a
function p(t), the L2 norm (defined as [
∫ |p|2dt]1/2) furnishes
a natural (Euclidean) distance for pairwise comparison. As
we have constructed uniformly sampled approximations of the
profiles, multiplying the usual (l2 Euclidean) vector distance to
the tuple of power observations by the ∆t = .01 gives a close
approximation to the integral. To construct baseline profile, we
cluster the uninfected training data using k−means clustering,
with k determined by the gap statistic method [36]. This
provides a sanity check—we hypothesize that our uninfected
training runs should be similar; hence, we expect a single
cluster with the centroid a canonical “baseline” function.
Indeed, for all tasks a single canonical baseline was found
by the gap statistic method. Fig. 3 depicts the baselines for
each task, as found on the ten uninfected training runs used
for unsupervised training. For the supervised approach, the
baseline is created from the 12 clean training profiles. Finally,
the feature for a given profile is the L2 distance to the baseline.
3) Permutation Entropy: Permutation Entropy, is a method
of time-series analysis that detects deviations in the short-term
wiggliness (roughly speaking) and has been used in various
time-series detection applications including epilepsy [24] and
motor bearing fault detection [37]. Our formulation follows
Cao et al. [24]. From a time-series data vector, (x1, . . . , xN )
(a power profile in our case) fix an m-length contiguous
sub-vector (xi, xi+1, ..., xi+m−1) and denote this vector as
(y0, ..., ym−1). Next sort the elements into increasing order,
(yj0 , ..., yjm−1), so either yjk < yjk+1 or yjk = yjk+1 and
jk + 1 = jk+1. Now, (j0, ..., jm−1) is the permutation of
the numbers (0, 1, ...,m − 1) indicating the rearrangement
necessary to sort the m-length vector. Given a time-series data
vector (x1, . . . , xn) (a power profile), we extract contiguous
sub-vectors of length m with overlap m/2, i.e., (x1, ..., xm),
(xm
2 +1
, ..., xm+m2 ), etc. Each m-length vector is converted to
one of the m! permutations by the process above, and we
represent the time-series as a bag of permutations. Our goal
is to learn how rare/likely the profile is by understanding the
likelihood of its permutations. To do this, we require a prob-
ability distribution over the sample space of m! permutations.
For a fixed task, we estimate the needed probability distri-
bution from the training runs on that task. Let O be the obser-
vations (multiset) of permutations across all training runs, and
for each permutation γ = (j0, ..., jm−1), let #(γ,O) denote
the number of times γ is observed in O. Then we use the
maximum a posteriori (MAP) estimation with uniform prior
to estimate γ’s probability, P (γ) := (#(γ,O)+1)/(|O|+m!).
This allows permutations never observed in training to have
positive likelihood, albeit very small. It is clear from the MAP
estimate that m must be chosen carefully, as for moderate
values of m, m! will easily dominate |O|, washing out the con-
tribution of our observations. We chose m = 6, which gives
3Kurtosis :=
∑N
i=1(xi−µ)4/(Nσ4)−3. This follows Fisher’s definition,
with 3 subtracted so normally distributed data yield 0.
m! = 720, while |O| = 61,680 for IE, 6,240 for Registry, and
53,980 for Idle tasks. Finally, for a given run we will compute
the entropy of the observed permutations as IID samples from
the distribution above. After converting an observed power
profile to a bag of permutations, (γi : i = i, ..., n), we compute
the permutation entropy, that is, the expected information of
the permutation, Hˆ = (1/n)
∑
i− log(P (γi))P (γi).
4) Data Smashing Distances: Data Smashing distance
(DSD) is a new algorithm pioneered by Chattopadhyay and
Lipson [23] for quantifying the distance between two time-
varying sequences. DSD assumes the non-restrictive hypoth-
esis that each sequence is a sample from a probabilistic
finite state automata (PFSA) and approximates the distance
between the underlying PFSAs.4 Roughly speaking, PFSA
are applicable models to any sequence of symbols where
the probability of a current symbol depends only on the
previous symbols. The DSD algorithm relies on mathematical
developments involving PFSA by Wen and Ray [38] who
discover a groups structure and metric on the set of PFSA.
DSD gives a novel, computationally efficient algorithm for ap-
proximating the distance between two PFSA from sufficiently
long symbol strings sampled from each. This operationalizes
the developments of Wen and Ray, as one need not know nor
try to infer the PFSA from the symbol observations.
In order to apply DSD, users must transform their time-
varying data into a sequence of symbols that is sufficiently
long. The expected string length required by the DSD algo-
rithm is strictly increasing in the number of symbols (factorial
in this variable) and the product of the symbol probabilities.5
Although the desired PFSA distance is symmetric (d(s1, s2) =
d(s2, s1)), DSD uses a probabilistic algorithm to approximate
the distance, and will produce similar but, in general, not
identical values as the order is switched. For this reason, given
two strings s1 and s2, we compute d(s1, s2) and d(s2, s1) and
store the average of the two as the distance. If either distance
is not returned, it indicates our strings are not long enough,
and this feature is not used.
We employ DSD on two symbol representations of the
power data, separately. The first transforms power samples
into two symbols, “high” and “low”, and is a stereotypi-
cal application of Data Smashing. This is referred to here-
after as “DSD Data Distance.” The threshold for the binary
representation is chosen for each pair of profiles, so the
number of power readings over and under the threshold are
equal. This maximizes the product of the probabilities of
each symbol, which helps ensure the symbols are sufficiently
long. Note that the baseline observed profiles are fixed, and
4A PFSA is (roughly speaking) a generative model for sampling a sequence
of symbols and is composed of a set of states, a stochastic state transition
matrix, and rules giving fixed symbol emissions on the transitions. PFSA are
similar to, but conceptually simpler than, hidden markov models (HMMs).
HMMs emit a sequence of symbols in a two-step process. The new state is
sampled according to the transition probabilities. Then a symbol is sampled
from the emission distribution for the new state. Rather than a probabilistic
symbol emission depending on the state, PFSA emit a fixed symbol deter-
mined by the transition.
5For details see the Proposition 13 in the supplementary text of [23].
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Fig. 3: (Watts vs. Seconds) Canonical profiles (baselines for L2 error) per task found by clustering unsupervised training data (ten uninfected runs) with
k-means clustering with L2 distance. Gap statistic used to find the no. of clusters, k, and k = 1 (as expected) is found in each case. Centriods (means of
each cluster) depicted.
to compute the DSD Data Distance between the baseline
and a newly observed given test profile, the threshold for
encoding both profiles as a binary high/low sequence is
dependent on both profiles. Hence, the binary sequence for
the baseline profile will be slightly different in each compar-
ison, but no prior knowledge of any test data is necessary.
Fig. 4: (Watts vs. Seconds) Canoni-
cal shapes found by clustering three-
second intervals of training data. Note
that the four shapes characterize high
power, low power, falling power, and
rising power.
The second application
seeks to model sequences of
shapes in the power curves
and is referred to as “DSD
Shape Distance.” To pro-
duce the shapes, the training
profiles are cut into three-
second intervals with 1.5-
second overlap. Then the
bag of all three second snip-
pets are clustered using k-
means and L2 distance as
in Sec. IV-A2. We manually
investigated the centroids as
k varied, choosing k = 4
as is maximal for which the
centroids are not very sim-
ilar curves. See Fig. 4 depicting the four canonical shapes
learned from the data. Finally, given a power profile, we cut
it into a sequence of three-second intervals, overlapping by
1.5 seconds, and assign to each interval the closest canonical
shape. This transforms a power profile into a sequence of four
“shape” symbols. Our conjecture is that profiles that exhibit a
clear pattern when uninfected (e.g., the IE baseline, top Fig. 3),
will give a regular sequence of shapes that may be disrupted
by malware execution.
In both transformations to a sequence of symbols, every
sequence is concatenated with itself 100 times to ensure the
strings are long enough to perform the algorithm. This can
be conceptualized as a simulation of running the same task
repeatedly 100 times. DSD Shape distance is not applicable to
the the Idle task runs because the strings are not long enough.
This is likely caused by the fact that the flat, low power shape
dominates the probabilities, making the product of the four
symbols probabilities very small. To obtain both the DSD Data
and DSD Shape feature value for a given a power profile, we
compute the distance between its symbol sequence and that of
all ten training runs concatenated together.
B. Unsupervised Approach: Anomaly Detection Ensemble
Treating the malware detection task as a one-class problem,
we construct a baseline for each feature from ten uninfected
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TABLE I: Unsupervised Test Data Z-Scores & Detection Results1
Uninfected Alureon Max Rootkit Pihar Sirefef Xpaj Threshold TPR FDR
Feature/Run 1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
I
E
T
a
s
k
Mean 0.53 1.13 0.59 0.95 0.96 4.40 5.26 2.52 3.33 3.29 3.68 2.10 2.30 2.06 1.38 3.59 3.43 2.06 2.19 2.68 1.00 0.06
Variance 0.55 0.40 1.09 0.46 0.46 4.56 5.52 1.83 2.88 2.59 2.48 2.38 2.20 1.56 1.56 3.22 2.39 1.89 2.00 1.80 1.00 0.06
Skewness 0.55 0.40 1.09 0.46 0.46 4.56 5.52 1.83 2.88 2.59 2.48 2.38 2.20 1.56 1.56 3.22 2.39 1.89 2.00 1.80 1.00 0.06
Kurtosis 0.55 0.40 1.09 0.46 0.46 4.56 5.52 1.83 2.88 2.59 2.48 2.38 2.20 1.56 1.56 3.22 2.39 1.89 2.00 1.80 1.00 0.06
L2 Error 0.88 0.72 0.61 0.02 0.31 2.55 2.35 2.63 1.34 2.07 1.42 2.66 1.62 1.96 2.04 2.04 1.09 1.29 1.09 1.68 1.00 0.00
Perm. Entropy4 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.07 0.01 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.00
DSD (Data)5 1.32 2.94 0.38 2.46 1.94 3.91 3.66 3.79 3.37 4.35 5.59 0.93 1.45 3.13 0.85 3.99 5.61 1.72 2.27 4.20 0.87 0.24
DSD (Shape)5 1.52 1.25 0.55 0.23 2.08 1.00 7.61 0.44 2.60 1.32 0.52 0.59 0.66 1.55 1.05 0.78 0.72 2.03 2.21 0.56 0.53 0.27
IE Votes3 2 3 3 1 2 7 7 6 7 7 6 5 6 7 6 6 6 7 7 6 4.7 1.00 0.00
R
e
g
i
s
t
r
y
T
a
s
k
Mean 0.94 1.11 1.22 1.52 0.19 1.28 1.89 1.27 2.19 1.96 1.99 1.08 2.22 1.32 1.21 1.84 2.00 1.88 2.07 2.06 1.00 0.17
Variance 1.01 1.05 1.24 1.48 0.00 1.09 1.95 1.06 1.96 2.04 2.10 1.05 2.03 1.27 1.41 2.23 2.13 1.81 2.41 2.04 1.00 0.21
Skewness 1.01 1.05 1.24 1.48 0.00 1.09 1.95 1.06 1.96 2.04 2.10 1.05 2.03 1.27 1.41 2.23 2.13 1.81 2.41 2.04 1.00 0.21
Kurtosis 1.01 1.05 1.24 1.48 0.00 1.09 1.95 1.06 1.96 2.04 2.10 1.05 2.03 1.27 1.41 2.23 2.13 1.81 2.41 2.04 1.00 0.21
L2 Error 0.93 1.20 1.00 0.89 1.55 2.02 2.39 1.48 2.22 2.52 2.27 1.71 2.72 2.05 1.69 2.50 2.32 2.42 2.63 2.03 1.00 0.12
Perm. Entropy4 0.02 0.17 0.15 0.04 0.16 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.19 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.00
DSD (Data)5 0.69 0.68 1.43 0.86 0.05 1.57 1.20 2.73 0.78 0.90 1.08 1.18 0.76 1.47 1.00 1.04 0.78 1.58 1.12 1.13 0.67 0.09
DSD (Shape)5 0.42 0.39 0.06 1.73 0.18 0.07 6.21 0.78 5.68 6.55 5.62 0.04 4.23 0.05 0.28 5.63 6.40 4.64 5.29 5.91 0.67 0.09
Registry Votes3 3 5 5 5 1 6 7 6 6 6 7 6 6 6 6 7 6 7 7 7 5.2 1.00 0.00
Mean 1.63 1.43 0.85 2.26 2.00 6.05 5.58 5.55 4.61 6.69 7.83 4.08 4.59 4.76 3.85 6.30 7.16 5.33 5.55 5.67 1.00 0.21
I
d
l
e
T
a
s
k
Variance 0.55 0.46 0.04 1.94 0.48 7.83 7.51 4.20 5.29 7.98 8.04 6.99 7.04 5.10 4.70 8.08 7.50 7.98 8.05 5.37 1.00 0.06
Skewness 0.55 0.46 0.04 1.94 0.48 7.83 7.51 4.20 5.29 7.98 8.04 6.99 7.04 5.10 4.70 8.08 7.50 7.98 8.05 5.37 1.00 0.06
Kurtosis 0.55 0.46 0.04 1.94 0.48 7.83 7.51 4.20 5.29 7.98 8.04 6.99 7.04 5.10 4.70 8.08 7.50 7.98 8.05 5.37 1.00 0.06
L2 Error 2.02 2.67 2.11 0.51 0.96 6.14 5.62 0.02 1.46 6.20 6.10 4.76 4.80 1.66 0.74 6.32 5.44 6.37 6.37 1.78 0.87 0.19
Perm. Entropy4 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.09 0.01 0.08 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00
DSD (Data)5 1.88 2.31 1.00 1.78 1.94 2.13 1.78 3.46 1.77 2.75 3.71 0.13 0.89 2.01 1.55 2.25 3.37 1.12 1.47 2.52 0.87 0.24
Idle Votes3 3 3 2 5 2 6 6 5 6 6 6 5 5 6 5 6 6 6 6 6 3.9 1.00 0.06
Total Votes2 8 11 10 11 5 19 20 17 19 19 19 16 17 19 16 19 18 20 20 19 11.2 1.0 0.0
1 Table depicts z-scores (computed using training features’ means and variances) of test set—five clean runs and three runs of each rootkit for all tasks. A z-score at least one
constitutes and anomalous vote, and these values are depicted in bold font. Threshold column gives the minimum number of votes needed for positive classification, computed
as the mean plus one standard deviation of the training vote totals. Sums of votes for each task reported, with task totals over threshold also in bold. Anomalous classification
as informed by all votes is indicated in the bottom row, red highlighted totals. TPR column gives the true positive rate (recall), while FDR gives the false detection rate (1-
precision), which is the percentage of alerts that are false positives. Shape sequences were not sufficiently long on Idle task runs to apply Data Smashing.
2 Analyzing the unsupervised results reveals perfect detection is obtained by the overall classifier, i.e., by using all three tasks’ votes.
3 Delving into each task shows perfect detection by the IE task alone and the Idle task alone, while the Registry task alone exhibits perfect true positive results with only a
0.0625 false detection rate (one false positive of sixteen alerts).
4 Zooming into the features that contribute least, notice first that the permutation entropy feature never deviates from the training mean by more than a standard deviation.
Qualitatively this means that the patterns of variation of the profiles over 6× .01s= .06s is not changed in a noticeable way by the rootkits tested. Quantitatively, this means
that inclusion of permutation entropy does not affect the detection outcomes.
5 Notice that DSD distance, both for shape symbol sequences and on the two-symbol representation of the power data struggle to beat the random baseline. Our observation
is that this method, while mathematically exciting, is not a good detector for the detection task at hand.
6 Finally, we discuss the features exhibiting strong classification performance. Inspecting the four moments we see that individually on each task all have perfect true-positive
rate and generally low false detection rate. Similar results are exhibited by the L2-norm feature. Hence, the distribution of the power data, regardless of the time progression
(encoded by the moments), and the overall shape of the profiles (encoded by L2-norm difference from the baseline profile) are the heavy lifters contributing to the correct
classification.
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training profiles of each task. Our ensemble classifier is
constructed from multiple instances of a simple single-feature
anomaly detector, all obeying a principled threshold univer-
sally—any observation that is at least one standard deviation
from the mean is considered anomalous, where the standard
deviation and the mean are computed on the training observa-
tions. Explicitly, for a given feature, let V = (vi : i = 1, ..., n)
be the training runs’ values, and let m, s be the the the mean
and standard deviation of V , respectively. Then given an ob-
servation of this feature, v, from either a training or testing run,
we compute the z-score normalization, z = |v−m|/s, and vote
if z ≥ 1. Thus, each of the features informs the single-feature
detector, and their tallies are the total votes in favor of alerting
on this profile. The number of votes are in turn the lone feature
for the final anomaly detector, which makes the classification
via the same criteria. The mean and standard deviation of the
training runs’ vote totals are computed; each run’s vote count
is converted to a z-score; those runs with z ≥ 1 are labeled
infected. Since computation of permutation entropy features
requires explicit estimation of a probability distribution over
the training data permutations, we can easily access m, the
mean information (permutation entropy of training data), and
s, the standard deviation of the information over the training
runs as follows, m :=
∑m!
i=1− log(P (γi))P (γi) = H(P ) and
s := [
∑m!
i=1[log
2(P (γi))P (γi)]−H(P )2]1/2. For permutation
entropy z-score computation, m, and s, as computed above
from the learned distribution are used.
The unsupervised detector classifies a run based on the
number of votes across all three tasks; consequently, we are
able to see the detection capabilities of each task’s vote sum
and also each feature individually. Recall from Sec. IV-B
that each feature value is normalized into a z-score using the
mean and variance of the ten clean training runs, and z ≥ 1,
indicating a value of more than one standard deviation from
the mean, constitutes a vote for this profile being anomalous.
The vote threshold for final classification is also computed as
the mean plus one standard deviation of the vote counts for the
training runs. These vote thresholds are then used to decide
the classification of the unseen test profiles.
Table I presents the results along with each test profiles’ set
of z-scores and the vote thresholds. Discussion of the results
and efficacy of the features occurs in the table notes. Notice
that the test set class bias is 25/75% uninfected/infected;
hence, assigning labels blindly according to this distribution
produces an expected true positive rate of 75% and false
detection rate of 25%. Even against this normalization, our
results are overwhelmingly positive and give strong empirical
evidence that the power profiles are changed sufficiently
by malware executions to admit detection. All together, the
ensemble does better than any single detector, which clearly
exhibits that this ensemble method reduces the false positives
of the constituent detectors without sacrificing the true positive
rate. In particular, using the ensemble overcomes the errant
votes from the DSD features as well as the ambient noise in the
power data from background processes. Our recommendation
TABLE II: Supervised Learning Results
SVM Kernel TP FP TN FN TPR FDR
Linear 15 3 12 0 1.00 0.17
RBF γ = 0.001 15 3 12 0 1.00 0.17
RBF γ = 0.01 15 3 12 0 1.00 0.17
RBF γ = 0.1 14 3 12 1 0.93 0.18
Polynomial d = 3 15 3 12 0 1.00 0.17
Polynomial d = 2 15 3 12 0 1.00 0.17
in light of this analysis and the supervised results is to use an
unsupervised ensemble detection method as above with only
five features, namely the four moments and the L2 distance.
C. Supervised Approach: Kernel SVMs
To test a supervised approach, we use hold-one-out valida-
tion on the rootkits; i.e., in each fold training is performed
on 12 of 15 uninfected profiles plus 12 infected profiles (3
profiles × 4 rootkits), and testing is performed on the 3 profiles
from the held-out rootikit combined with the remaining three
uninfected profiles. We test kernel SVMs as the kernels allow
versatility and non-linear decision boundaries. Our implemen-
tation used SciKit-Learn [39] to test the following six kernels:
linear, radial basis function (RBF) with γ = 0.1, 0.01, 0.001,
and polynomial of degree two and three. The features for the
learner match those of the unsupervised approach, Sec. IV-A.
Table II depicts micro-averaged results, showing perfect
or near perfect true positive rate (TPR), with 17-18% false
detection rates (FDR). As the test sets comprised of non-biased
classes (50% clean/50% infected) a random classification
would expect 50% TPR and FDR. These results give further
empirical evidence that the power profiles are changed in a
detectable way by malware. Our conclusion is that the one-
class anomaly detection is more suited for this capability.
V. CONCLUSION
In this work we investigate a power-based malware detection
approach for general-purpose computers. By monitoring CPU
power consumption under a fixed set of tasks, we programmat-
ically gathered power data in the presence and absence of five
rootkits. To characterize the power data, statistical moments
in conjunction with more sophisticated time-series-analytic
features are used. We test both a one-class anomaly detection
ensemble (only training on uninfected data) and many kernel
SVMs (trained on both uninfected and infected runs, but tested
on data from unseen malware samples and uninfected profiles).
Our results allow analysis of each feature and task, but the
overall result is that perfect detection is achievable (at least in
our test environment) by the one-class method.
Our work proves the concept that rootkit actions change the
power profile of the CPU in a detectable manner. Because of
the high variability of workloads that general-purpose comput-
ers undergo, using anomaly detection on ambient power usage
is not a viable option (at least from our results and method).
However, we hypothesize that certain malware can be induced
to reveal its presence, and have proven that baselining the
power consumption of a fixed set of tasks is a potential avenue
for future detection technology. The tasks in our experiment
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(especially IE), may experience high variability over time in a
real-world setting (e.g., added IE plugins, resolving different
URLs, etc.) that could create false positives. Therefore, our
next steps will involve crafting/testing tasks that promise a
predictable power curve in a non-lab environment and can
induce rootkits action (e.g., printing a small fixed section of
the registry). We note that accurate results were possible with
relatively slow sampling rates.6 This indicates that the malware
tested is not subtle when executing, but our sampling rates may
be insufficient for detection of future malware. Research to
increase the sampling rate is necessary, especially for accurate
baselining of very small fixed instructions sequences. Overall,
we believe this work is a valuable step towards a promising
option for malware detection.
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